There has been great focus in the recent trade theory literature on the introduction of firm heterogeneity into trade models. This introduction has highlighted the importance of the entry/exit decision of firms in response to changes in trade barriers. However, it is typical in many of these models to use iceberg transport costs as a general form of trade barriers that can be interchangeable with ad valorem tariffs. I show that this is not always an appropriate conclusion. Specifically, I illustrate that profit for an exporter is more elastic in response to tariffs than iceberg transport costs, which has implications for total product variety. One such implication is the possibility for there to be an anti -variety effect associated with lower transport costs while there also being a pro-variety effect associated with lower tariffs.
Introduction
There has been great focus in the recent trade theory literature on the introduction of firm heterogeneity into trade models. Beginning with Jean (2002) and Melitz (2003) , one of the literature's key results is that increased trade restrictions lead to increases in average productivity for exporters and decreases in average productivity for domestic firms. These models, among many others, have provided a significant advancement in the literature on intra-industry trade since its conception with Krugman (1979 Krugman ( , 1980 . This comes, in part, from highlighting the entry and exit mechanism of firms, as this has direct ramifications for the number (or mass) of varieties in equilibrium. Since consumers in these models show a love of variety, this has important welfare implications; if more low productivity domestic firms exit in response to lower trade barriers than foreign exporting firms enter, the domestic country actually loses varieties from freer trade. This is indeed interesting since all the gains from trade in the "New Trade Theory" stemmed purely from gains in variety.
The more recent trade theory still finds gains from trade. However, the effect on product variety has less consensus. In Melitz (2003) , the effect on the total mass of varieties in a particular country is left ambiguous. Baldwin and Forslid (forthcoming) address this issue and find that decreased trade restrictions, in fact, have a counterintuitive anti-variety effect for the importing country. However, Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) find that decreased trade restrictions have an pro-variety effect. In all three models (as in most models dealing with such issues), trade restrictions are modeled as the standard iceberg transportation cost.
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Although iceberg trade costs are equivalent to ad valorem tariffs in some settings, they are not equivalent in the case of monopolistic competition. Therefore one cannot take the lessons learned from the existing literature and blindly apply them to changes in tariffs, which is important if one is interested in strategic trade policy. 2 A key contribution of this paper is to show iceberg transport costs affect firm profits and consequently the entry/exit decision differently than ad valorem tariffs in a monopolistic competition setting. This has direct implications for product variety.
To accomplish this, I provide a highly tractable model of heterogeneous firms that allows for asymmetric changes in three types of trade barriers; iceberg transport costs, ad valorem tariffs, and the additional fixed cost to become an exporter. Chaney (2008) uses a model with asymmetric iceberg transport costs and country sizes to investigate the effects of the elasticity of substitution on both the intensive and extensive margins of trade. He finds that the elasticity of substitution always dampens the impact of iceberg transport costs on trade flows. In particular, the decreased sensitivity of the extensive margin outweighs the increased sensitivity of the intensive margin. In addition to modeling methods, this paper differs from Chaney (2008) 5 The use of fixed cost heterogeneity results in all firms of the same "type" (either pure domestic or exporting) to charge the same price. This obviously affects firm demand and profits which in turn affects the entry and exit decision. However, this does not eliminate the differences between iceberg transport costs and ad valorem tariffs as trade barriers. 6 See also Becker (2009 model to incorporate the additional option for a firm to become a multinational. They find that a country's Nash tariff is higher than the global optimum (which is a subsidy) and that FDI mitigates this difference. Finally, in addition to the typical barriers to trade (tariffs and transport costs), I consider the effect of "foreign beachhead costs", that is, those fixed costs necessary to switch to engage 8 It should be noted that income does change in response to changes in trade barriers and this income change affects welfare. However, it will all be through changes in consumption/production of the numeraire and not affect the heterogeneous goods sector. in exporting.
10 This is often a minor consideration, but with the rapid technological growth and service industries being created to facilitate business operations, these beachhead costs are becoming increasingly important. Friedman (2007) 
The Model
There are two countries labeled and . Country ( ) is endowed with¯(¯) units of labor which is the sole factor of production. Without loss of generality, let¯≥¯. There are two sectors. Sector 1 is the numeraire and consists of a homogeneous good ( ) that is produced under constant returns to scale, freely traded, and sold in a perfectly competitive market. Sector 2 consists of a continuum of differentiated goods, each variety of which is indexed by . As is standard in the Melitz model, this is produced under increasing returns to scale in a monopolistically competitive market with free entry. Unlike sector 1, this market may face both transportation costs and tariff barriers. With the exception of the differing labor endowments and (potentially) tariff rates, countries are identical. Therefore, analyzing the situation for country informs us of the analogous situation for country , and I will refer to country as the domestic country to ease discussion.
Sector 1
The price of is normalized to 1 in each market. Assuming that one unit of labor is needed for production, this will normalize the wage in each country to unity. Finally, I assume that in equilibrium a positive amount of is produced in each country.
Consumers
The representative consumer in country has quasi-linear preferences with an embedded Dixit-Stiglitz utility function which displays love for variety over the heterogeneous good;
where = 1/(1 − ) > 1 is the elasticity of substitution, is the total mass of varieties in country , denotes aggregate consumption of the numeraire, and can be interpreted as the amount of a composite good comprised of the different varieties of the heterogeneous goods ( ). Quasi-linear utility will isolate the decision whether to become an exporter or not without any income feedback effects; providing a model that allows for asymmetric changes in trade restrictions (e.g. unilateral tariff policy) to be easily analyzed. 11 Moreover, this specification allows me to compare the differences between an ad valorem tariff and iceberg trade costs on productivity and variety without having to account for the income effects of the tariff or the "wasteful" costs of iceberg transport costs. Finally, I assume that income in each country is sufficiently large that both and goods are consumed. 11 Demidova and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) use a small country assumption to eliminate the income feedback effects. However, this assumption would only be appropriate when investigating strategic trade policy between two countries of asymmetric size. I too can allow for asymmetric country sizes in my model. This could be done in two ways. One is by increasing the labor of one country. However, since is the same, the expenditure on the heterogeneous good is still identical and this would be a trivial change. A second way would be to have different s. In this scenario, one would need to be careful that the other parameters were such to ensure a firm in country didn't export to country without also supplying to its domestic market.
Consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraint:
where ( ) is the price of variety paid by consumers and is aggregate income in country .
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The solution to this problem yields a demand function for the heterogeneous good of variety in country :
Since preferences are identical across both countries, it follows that the total expenditure on the heterogeneous good is equal to in both foreign and domestic markets.
Heterogeneous Firms
There are a continuum of firms, each of which holds a unique position on an index, where each point represents a unique variety and productivity level. 14, 15 Armed with this index the firm decides whether to serve the domestic market and/or the overseas market. To serve a given market, the firm must incur a fixed cost. These costs are referred to as 'beachhead' costs and can be interpreted as forming a distribution and servicing network. To serve its domestic market, a firm with index must hire ( ) units of labor (making the fixed cost of serving this market ( )). If a firm chooses to serve the foreign market, it can do so through exports and pay an extra ( ). I assume that > 1; ′ ( ) > 0 and ′′ ( ) ≥ 0, i.e. the 12 Note that if tariffs are set to zero or the firm is domestic the prices, ( ) = ( ), are equivalent. 13 Recall that under perfect competition, the price of is equal to one. 14 One interpretation of the model is that firms are owned by entrepreneurs and that firm profits accrue to these entrepreneurs. In my representative agent setting, these profits would simply enter national income in the same way that wages do, therefore I discuss the model in terms of firms to avoid needless jargon. This interpretation is similar to that of Yu (2002) . 15 It is common in heterogeneous firm models to have entrepreneurs draw from a distribution of productivities (often at a cost). The advantage to that approach is that it permits multiple varieties to have the same productivity. The cost, however, is one of added complexity and additional assumptions since modelers are often forced to parameterize this distribution (the Pareto distribution is a common choice). Here, my assumption of unique variety/productivity combinations aids greatly in the presentation of my results in the simplest, most tractable fashion.
mapping from the index to the labor required for beachhead costs is increasing and convex in the index. 16 Thus, firms requiring fewer workers to cover beachhead costs have a lower index . These fixed cost differences are the source of firm heterogeneity. A firm, therefore, faces the following menu of fixed costs (measured in units of labor): Goods that are exported from country to country are subject to melting-iceberg transport costs, = 1 + ≥ 1, where a firm must ship units in order for one unit to arrive at its destination. I assume that transport costs are symmetric and thus omit country subscripts.
17 I do not investigate the effect of a per-unit transport cost; since marginal costs are normalized to one, this would have the same effect as iceberg transport costs.
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Additionally, an exporting firm from country is subject to an ad valorem tariff , where I define ≡ 1 + . Furthermore, I assume that a government is unable to distinguish a particular firm's type, so any tariff is an across-the-board tariff applied to all exporters. Note that tariffs can differ across countries.
The decision to become a firm and which market(s) to service depends on the associated profit for each type. Recall that the numeraire yields wages equal to one in both countries, thus the operating profits from serving the domestic market are
Given the nature of monopolistic competition, the price will be a constant mark-up over marginal cost and be equal to 1 . From market clearing, set ( ) = ( ), and the firm has the following profit function for supplying to the domestic market only: The decision to become an exporter stems purely from the additional profits from serving the foreign market. 19 The main contribution of this paper is to illustrate that there is an important distinction between modeling trade restrictions as iceberg transport costs or ad valorem tariffs. Consequently, I will explicitly derive the additional profit function from exports for the firm in country exporting to country . This function is:
It can easily be seen by ( ) ( ) − ( ) ( ) = ( ) ( ), that imposing a tariff on the firm is analogous to imposing it on the consumer. Recalling that ( ) is the price consumers pay, the demand for variety is
19 Since preferences are identical across both countries, it follows that the total expenditure on the heterogeneous good is equal to in both markets. Furthermore, recall that technologies and the mass of entrepreneurs are also identical across countries. This, along with > 1, is sufficient to ensure that a firm that exports will always serve the domestic market.
Thus (6) can be written as
Note that the presence of a tariff is just a monotonic transformation of the profit function, so the firm's optimal price setting rule is unaffected by the tariff (it is still a constant markup over marginal cost). However, the price paid by the consumer, , is affected. Therefore, the exporting firm's optimal price is
and the price consumers pay for exported variety (imported from their perspective) is
Thus, regardless of whether one chooses to model trade restrictions as iceberg transport costs, ad valorem tariffs, or some more general term encompassing them both, = , the affect on the price consumers pay is the same -the restriction is completely passed through onto them. However, the effect on firm profits are, in fact, different and this is important when dealing with a general equilibrium model and firm entry. To see this, input the price, (9) , into the firm profit function (8)
The underbraced term is the key here. Due to the monopolistic nature of the model, firms charge a markup over marginal cost and transport costs are included in marginal cost.
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Recall = 1 + . If a firm ships one unit, it loses units in transport, but gains from it's ability charge a price higher than marginal cost, for a net gain (excluding demand effects) of > 0. Conversely, a tariff results only in decreased demand, which as seen by (10) is identical to that of iceberg transport cost. Thus, not only are profits higher with iceberg transport costs compared to an identical ad valorem tariff, but the sensitivity of profits to changes in these two different forms of trade restrictions differs as well; i.e. the variable profit will be more elastic with respect to tariffs than iceberg transport costs. 21 Essentially, through monopolistic power, the firm is able to recoup a portion of its losses in transport;
whereas tariff revenue is completely captured by the domestic government. The markup over marginal cost drives a wedge between the effect of iceberg transport costs and an ad valorem tariff.
The effect of trade restrictions on product variety is an important welfare consideration and is determined by the extent domestic varieties enter to replace imported foreign varieties.
Since the choice of trade restrictions affects the variable profit elasticity and consequently the foreign firm's decision to enter or exit, this has implications with regard to product variety.
For notational ease, I will write profits from exports as:
Again, note the different exponents on tariffs ( ) and transport costs ( ), a difference at the heart of the differing variety effects.
Relaxing Modeling Assumptions
In this section, I briefly describe the affects of two specific assumptions on the generality of results. To begin, suppose firms were additionally heterogeneous across marginal costs, ( ).
This means that firms charge a different price, ( ) for an exporter. 22 Additionally, let (p , (⋅)) be the expenditure on the heterogeneous good in country , which a function 21 This will be shown later. 22 Recall equation (10) .
of the vector of prices and income. Therefore, an exporting firm is faced with the following general profit function:
i.e. the term becomes more complex.
For a baseline model, I assume that ( ) = 1 for all , and = . It can be seen that allowing marginal cost to differ across firms will have an affect on the results. However, since the is raised to a different exponent than in the underbraced, term differences still arise for different trade barriers. Furthermore, using a different utility function will obviously affect (p , (⋅)). 23 In particular, tariffs generate income where iceberg transport costs are generally assumed to be wasted. There are two points to be made with regard to this:
One, in order for tariffs to have the same affect on exporting firm profits as iceberg transport costs, the utility function would have to result in
is more restrictive than assuming quasi-linear preferences; and two, as mentioned in the introduction, there is a transportation sector that does generate income. To be completely rigorous, I would need to model this sector. However, it would seem to be a very special case, in which tariffs and transport costs affect income in the such a way to offset the differences highlighted by the underbraced term in equation (13) . Therefore, the result that ad valorem tariffs affect exporting profits differently than iceberg transport costs is not driven by my simple baseline model.
Equilibrium
Firms will enter each market as long as there are positive profits, that is, until equations (5) and (12) are driven to zero. Thus, define the cut-off firms as the firms that draw the values 23 Note though, that and affect p in the exact same way, as shown by equation (10) .
in the index ( ) that solves the following equalities:
The indices and represent the firms that are indifferent between producing the heterogeneous good and not producing at all in country and respectively. The indices and represent the firms that are indifferent between serving both the domestic and foreign markets and serving only the domestic market. Furthermore, the terms on the left-hand side of the equalities represent the variable profit for a particular firm and are functions of the total mass of firms (domestic and foreign). Figure 1 illustrates the profits, with zero variable trade costs, of firms in country including those who export and those who only sell domestically. 24 It can be seen that the greater the index , the greater the fixed cost to enter a market, and thus the lower the profits.
The intersection with the horizontal axis represents the index in which profits are zero for operating in that particular market. Note that the line representing export profits defines the profits from exporting in addition to serving the domestic market. In other words, firms with an index ∈ [0, ] make profits from exporting and serving the domestic market, and firms with an index ∈ ( , ] make profits from only serving the domestic market. Firms with an index > do not produce.
After careful inspection of the equilibrium conditions, it can be seen that this is, in fact, two systems of two equations and two unknowns: equations (14) and (17) and equations (15) and (16) . 25 Moreover, due to the symmetry it is sufficient to only focus on one country.
I will focus on the output market in country , and thus equations (14) and (17) . For future 24 For numerical simulations, I assume that the function ( ) is linear. 25 This nice simplification stems from the utility specification used. use, it will be helpful to rewrite the equilibrium conditions, (14) and (17) , in the following manner:
Changes in Equilibrium
Although, I cannot explicitly solve for the cutoff values without assuming a functional form of the fixed cost mapping ( ), I am still able to characterize the comparative statics. Totally differentiating this system of equations (18) and (19) yields the following comparative statics:
where
, and
The term ( ) represents the elasticity of fixed costs with respect to the index , evaluated at . Equations (20) There does exist a ( , ) pair that equates the comparative statics (20) with (21) and (23) with (24). This pair solves the following equality, respectively:
As can be seen, the ( , ) pair that equates (20) with (21) is not the same pair that equates (23) with (24). This reinforces the fact that iceberg transport costs are not isomorphic to ad valorem tariffs.
Variety Effect
As just shown, different trade barriers affect the entry and exit decision by firms in different ways. This is important for two main reasons; the effect on total variety is part of welfare and if two or more barriers are changing at the same time, it is critical to understand these differences to know if these changes will amplify or negate each other. Therefore, I now investigate how each trade barrier affects the equilibrium mass of varieties. The corresponding effects on the mass of varieties in country are as follows:
It can be seen from equations (28) This is a sufficient and necessary condition. A more restrictive condition for a pro-variety effect, although one that is perhaps more intuitive, is if the elasticity of ( ) with respect to the index is nondecreasing in . Examples would include both linear, exponential, and power functions of .
It is difficult to compare the magnitudes of the variety effects from changes in iceberg transport costs and ad valorem tariffs because these magnitudes depend on the actual values of and . 28 However, I can comment about the direction of these variety effects.
Plugging this into (28) yields:
27 Note that this is the case when ∂ /∂ < 0. 28 For purposes of comparison, one logical choice would be to evaluate the comparative statics when the trade restrictions are equal. Let = = ≥ 1, then
It is straightforward that
It is obvious that the contrapositive to Corollary 1 is also true, that is
The fact that trade restrictions can have an ambiguous effect on total product variety in a country is not surprising or new. What is surprising and new is that it is possible for there to be an anti-variety effect associated with lower transport costs while there also being a provariety effect associated with lower tariffs. Thus, under certain specifications a reduction in both trade barriers could lead to no change in total product variety. Again, these differences are driven by how iceberg transport costs affect profit differently than an ad valorem tariff.
Changes in a firm's variable profit ( ) is the reason for entry and exit and the variable profit is more elastic with respect to tariffs than iceberg transport costs:
This, in turn, affects the elasticity of the firm cutoffs -the cutoffs for an exporting and a purely domestic firm are more elastic in response to a change in an ad valorem tariff than iceberg transport costs. Turning now to the elasticity of total variety, , which I define as and for tariffs and transport cost respectively:
Comparing the two elasticities yields:
One has to be careful in interpreting this result given the results of Corollary 1. If there is a pro-variety effect associated with a decrease in iceberg transport costs, then the total product variety is more elastic (but is negative) with respect to tariffs. If there is an antivariety effect associated with a decrease in ad valorem tariffs, then the total product variety is less elastic (but is positive) with respect to tariffs. Finally, there are scenarios in which the two trade barriers have opposite effects on variety resulting in ambiguity as to the relative elasticities.
Conclusion
It is common in the recent trade literature to simply assume iceberg transport costs as a 
